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1 A Turbulent Reading
As a statistician frequently in the friendly skies, I was intrigued by the article \To catch a terrorist: can
ethnic pro¯ling work?" in Signi¯cance (Press, 2010; hereafter \the article", and all page numbers below
refer to this article). As a matter of fact, I read it during a °ight, on my way to a conference honoring
Larry Brown's 70th birthday. The statement that (p. 167) \Surprisingly, and bizarrely, this turns out
to be the most e±cient way of catching the terrorist." particularly caught my eye. I didn't know it was
possible to formulate statistically or probabilistically \the most e±cient way" to catch a terrorist. The
indication that something is rather unusual of course further enticed me to study it carefully.
The optimality formulation turned out to be possible because the article adopted a simple mathemat-
ical setting. Speci¯cally, the article assumed a population of N individuals passing through a network
of airport checkpoints, and exactly one of them is a terrorist. It also assumed that \perfect actuarial
information" (p. 166) is available in the form of pi, that is, the prior probability that individual i is the
terrorist. The article then asked: at airport checkpoints, what is the optimal probability qi to pull out
the ith individual for an enhanced security screening (e.g., a pat-down or a full body scan), given the
(expected) resource constraint that
PN
i=1 qi = M(· N)? The optimality criterion used was to minimize
the expected number of times that the terrorist goes through checkpoints \before he happens to be
selected for screening" (p. 166):
¹ =
N X
i=1
pi
qi
: (1)
The aforementioned \the most e±cient way" then refers to the \optimal probabilities":
qi =
M
p
pi
PN
k=1
p
pk
; i = 1;:::;N: (2)
I felt a bit of turbulence. Earlier on page 166, it was stated that without resource constraint the
optimal strategy is to pull out \every single passenger" (emphasis is original), i.e., to set qi = 1 for all
i. However, (2) does not lead to this conclusion when M = N. Nor does it lead to the obvious strategy
at the other extreme, that is, when M = 1. If only one person can be selected, what else can be better
than pulling out the person with the highest prior probability, when the prior information is \perfect"?
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1An astute reader may have also noticed that in general the q0
is of (2) cannot possibly be the optimal
probabilities under any criterion, because they are not guaranteed to be between zero and one. The same
problem occurred when the article argued (p. 166) that \strong pro¯ling", by which it meant qi = Mpi,
has the same expected value ¹ as uniform sampling, because again qi = Mpi can exceed one unless
M · 1. But here \M =
PN
i=1 qi is the number of passengers out of total N that we can a®ord to select
for secondary screening" (p. 166) and hence M ¸ 1; it would make little practical sense to assume that
airport checkpoints can only a®ord pulling out one person for an enhanced check.
The source for the mathematical oversight seems to be an unfortunate mix of notation. Before
presenting its equation (4) (same as (2) above), the article stated that (p. 166) \subject to the constraint
that M, the proportion of people overall that we check, is held constant," suggesting a rede¯nition of M
as M=N. However, if this rede¯nition was intended (for which I cannot think of a good reason), then
the constraint needs to be reset as
PN
i=1 qi = MN. Otherwise the problem discussed in the article after
its equation (4) would assume 1=N times the resource as the one before its equation (4), making the
mathematical formulation irrelevant for the reason mentioned above. It would also make the subsequent
comparisons meaningless. For example, the assertion (p. 167) that its equation (5), the expected time
under its equation (4), is less than its equation (3), the expected time under uniform sampling|which
was expressed as N=M, not 1=M|is true mathematically only when the two M's are the same.
This mathematical oversight is easy to ¯x, and the correct solution will partially invalidate the
assertion that the optimal strategy under (1) would \underplay" prior information (p. 167); see Section 3
below. However, something more profound than this oversight is needed to explain why (2) does not
deliver the aforementioned obvious strategy even in the case of M = 1. Before I present the reason,
however, let me emphasize that no one likes to be pulled out simply because of his or her ethnicity or
anything of that sort. Therefore, the overall conclusion of the article that ethnic pro¯ling is unacceptable
can be argued meaningfully in many other ways, as the article presented. What I am discussing here is
the article's probabilistic and statistical arguments. In the current setting, once the prior probabilities
pi's are given, then whatever criterion we adopt, the resulting optimal strategy will only depend on the
values of these pi's, not on their meaning or how they are derived. This potential for more general
applicability makes it critical to ensure the correctness of theoretical results and to explicate when they
are applicable in scienti¯c publications. Below I will discuss why minimizing (1) is not an appropriate
criterion in the context of airport enhanced security checks.
2 Catching a Terrorist or Stopping an Imminent Threat?
The article arrived at (1) by casting the \pulling out" problem in the classic framework of sampling with
replacement, which it argued (p. 167) is justi¯able because any particular checkpoint is \only one of
many airport security checkpoints through which terrorists pass." Whereas this statement is useful in
2reminding us to be prepared at each security checkpoint, we must also remind ourselves that the whole
purpose of airport security checks is to prevent terrorists from getting on any °ight where they will carry
out an act of terrorism. Given that a terrorist will only have one chance to carry out his act on an
airplane, because he will be either dead or detained after acting out, we clearly need to maximize the
probability of pulling him out the ¯rst time he comes to an airport with a (detectable) device that he
intends to use. We would have a far more serious problem than worrying about airport checkpoints if
any terrorist is allowed to be \sampled with replacement," that is, he carried out his plot on a plane,
but somehow escaped and shows up at another airport checkpoint!
To put it crisply, the ultimate goal of an enhanced screening is not to catch a terrorist|if a terrorist
comes to an airport without bringing anything or acting in any way that would increase his probability
of being identi¯ed as such, then placing the task of identifying him through airport checkpoints is not a
meaningful goal. The ultimate goal of an enhanced screening is to minimize imminent threat, i.e., to stop
any individuals who will carry out a harmful act once they get on a plane. We therefore do not have the
luxury to wait for another chance to catch them. A cartoon posted outside a colleague's o±ce illustrates
this point vividly. It shows an instructor at a terrorist training camp who is ready to demonstrate how
to detonate a suicide bomb, remarking \Look very carefully, because I can only do this once."
A predecessor to Press (2010), Press (2009), provided me with a plausible explanation of why this
distinction was overlooked. There, the \pro¯ling problem" was formulated as a governmental hunting
of a malfeasor among N individuals, where the government has a \meaningful prior probability" pi that
the ith individual is its target. Both \authoritarian strategy" and \democratic strategy" were discussed
there. The \authoritarian strategy" is that the government enumerates all its citizens, and screens them
one by one without replacement until the malfeasor is found. In the presence of moral or practical
constraints, a government may adopt a \democratic strategy" determined by some public policies, where
screening processes are memory-less, that is, if an individual passes them, s/he will still be liable to be
sampled again because negative screening results are not recorded. (If the screening result is positive,
then of course the game is over, unless the screening is not 100% accurate, a complication also discussed
in Press, 2009.) Airport security checkpoints were cited in Press (2009) as such a memory-less screening
process. Hence, in that context, the purpose of airport checkpoints becomes helping the government to
catch a malfeasor, deviating from its original goal of minimizing imminent threat to °ight safety.
But even for this \malfeasor hunting" problem, there is a more subtle mathematical reason why
criterion (1) is inappropriate. Let us assume now that the sampling with replacement is appropriate,
and that the government has resources to conduct L national searches sequentially, and each time it can
a®ord pulling out (on average) M individuals to conduct a memory-less screening. Given the probability
qi of pulling out the ith individual during each search (the memory-less property implies that qi stays
the same for all searches), the probability that the ith person is never pulled out is ei = (1 ¡ qi)L.
Consequently, unless we set qi = 1 for all i's such that pi > 0, there is at least one positive probability
3eipi, however tiny, such that the malfeasor is the one who escapes every screening. The corresponding
expected time to screening therefore is not de¯ned (other than treating it as in¯nity).
Press (2009, 2010) avoided this problem by (implicitly) using L = 1, which led to (1). This,
however, does not avoid the inherent sensitivity of the expected time to extreme events, a well-known
non-robustness of expectation. One can see from (1) that it will go to in¯nity if any single qi goes to zero
unless the corresponding pi is zero. Therefore, the optimal strategy under (1) will necessarily allocate
resource to any individual with nonzero pi no matter how tiny it might be. The aggregated e®ect is that
such a \most e±cient" strategy will necessarily reduce the maximal possible probability of pulling out
the actual terrorist at a given checkpoint, and the reduction can be substantial when M=N is not too
close to one and the prior probabilities are reasonably informative, as shall be demonstrated in Section 3.
The mathematical di±culty with a ¯nite L itself is telling us that we are not looking at the right
criterion. When L is permitted to grow without limit, then the probability of eventually pulling out the
terrorist is one, and hence minimizing the time to pull him out is meaningful. But with any given ¯nite
L, there is always a chance that the terrorist will never be pulled out, and hence we have to focus on
minimizing this probability of escape, which, under the setting of Press (2009), is
PL =
N X
i=1
(1 ¡ qi)Lpi: (3)
We can then minimize (3) subject to the constraint
PN
i=1 qi = M. For the \malfeasor hunting" problem
in Press (2009), which does not cap L, we will see in Section 4 that the optimal strategy for minimizing
(3) indeed will converge to uniform sampling qi = M=N as L ! 1, though this does not mean that
the impact of the prior will vanish completely at the limit. In terms of stopping an imminent threat,
however, we have to set L = 1, and hence the optimality criterion is to minimize P1, as shown below.
3 Correctly Minimizing, and Minimizing the Correct Criterion
To simplify the notation without loss of generality, we will assume the pi's are sorted in descending
order, namely, 1 > p1 ¸ p2 ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸ pN > 0; recall
PN
i=1 pi = 1 under the article's assumption of a single
terrorist. Furthermore, to avoid mathematical complications that are too involved to discuss in this
article, all the optimal solutions presented below should be understood as representing an equivalence
class of solutions, including randomized ones (e.g., if a solution calls for pulling out the ¯rst M individuals
for certain, but pM+1 = pM, then any randomized procedure that shares the pulling probability qM by
the Mth and the (M + 1)st individuals will obviously also be optimal).
To minimize (1) correctly, we let
~ qi =
[M ¡ (i ¡ 1)]
p
pi
PN
k=i
p
pk
; for i = 1;:::;M; (4)
and let I be the largest i such that ~ qi ¸ 1; if no such i exists, we let I = 0. (A subtlety here: although ~ qi
is not necessarily decreasing in i, simple algebra shows that ~ qj ¸ 1 for all j · I.) Here I is the number of
4individuals our resource can a®ord pulling out with certainty. When M = N, ~ qN = 1 and hence I = N,
that is, we will pull out everyone, con¯rming the obvious optimal strategy discussed in Section 1. When
M < N, ~ qM =
p
pM=
PN
k=M
p
pk < 1, and hence I · M ¡ 1, always leaving resources to be distributed
to the remaining N ¡ I individuals.
Given I as de¯ned above, the correct optimal qi for minimizing (1) is given by
qi =
(
1; i = 1;:::;I;
(M¡I)
p
pi PN
k=I+1
p
pk; i = I + 1;:::;N:
(5)
This result can be obtained by adding the inequality constraint 0 · qi · 1 to the derivation that led to
(2). An elementary proof is given in the Appendix, using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
This correct solution indicates that as long as I > 0, even under (1), the optimal strategy tend to
\overplay" prior information (p. 167), because it will pull out for certain the I individuals with the
highest prior probabilities. A simple example illustrates the interplay between the informativeness of
the prior probabilities and the resource constraint in determining the value of I. Suppose N individuals
consist of two groups, N0 of them with the same high value p1 and the remaining N ¡N0 with the same
lower value pN, and M > N0. Let r = pN=p1, and ½ = (M ¡N0)=(N ¡N0). Then (4) and (5) imply that
when the prior is discriminative enough relative to the resource constraint, in the sense that
p
r · ½, the
optimal strategy will pull out everyone in the high-value group for certain, and pull out everyone in the
other group uniformly with the sampling rate ½. Indeed, in this case, this strategy also minimizes the
escaping probability P1, demonstrating the in°uence of strong prior information. However, when
p
r > ½,
I = 0 and hence (2) provides the optimal strategy under (1), di®ering from the one that minimizes P1.
The optimal solution under P1 =
PN
i=1(1¡qi)pi is of course well known: set qi = 1 for i = 1;:::;M,
and qi = 0 for the rest; we will label this strategy Q1. The minimal value of P1 therefore is P
(Q1)
1 =
PN
i=M+1 pi, which can be considerably smaller than the probability of escape under uniform sampling
or under (5). As an illustrative example, suppose N = 880 and M = 220, and the prior is given by
pi =
8
> <
> :
1
100; i = 1;:::;40;
1
400; i = 41;:::;240;
1
6400; i = 241;:::;880:
(6)
Although the individual prior probabilities might seem rather low with their maximum being 1%, under
the optimal strategy Q1, P
(Q1)
1 = 15%, compared with P1 = 75% under uniform sampling.
This ¯nding is inconsistent with a main assertion on page 164, that even if one puts aside moral
and other practical issues and \even with unrealistically perfect data it is surprisingly di±cult to gain
any bene¯t from such pro¯ling." The \surprising di±culty" apparently is induced by the inappropriate
criterion (1). Indeed, for the current example, it is easy to verify that (2) yields
qi =
8
> <
> :
1; i = 1;:::;40;
1
2 i = 41;:::;240;
1
8; i = 241;:::;880:
(7)
5These values do provide the correct optimal strategy under (1), though if we set M any larger, we will
need to use (5). However, under this strategy, the probability of escape is
P1 = 40 £ 0 £
1
100
+ 200 £
1
2
£
1
400
+ 640 £
7
8
£
1
6400
=
27
80
= 33:75%: (8)
Although this represents 55% reduction from uniform sampling, moving to Q1 will lead to another (about)
55% reduction in the P1 value, a reduction that is hard to argue as insubstantial on its own.
4 A Mathematical Justi¯cation for Uniform Sampling?
It is true, however, that the reduction in PL of (3) from either uniform sampling or from (5) to optimal
PL tend to (but not always) become less as L grows. When L > 1, we can de¯ne
¸ qi = 1 ¡
(i ¡ M)p
¡(L¡1)
¡1
i Pi
k=1 p
¡(L¡1)¡1
k
; for i = M;:::;N: (9)
Let K be the largest i such that ¸ qi > 0; note such K must exist because ¸ qM = 1. (Again, ¸ qi is not
necessarily decreasing, but ¸ qi > 0 for all i · K.) Here K is the number of non-zero qi's in QL, the
optimal solution for minimizing PL of (3), which is given by
qi =
8
<
:
1 ¡
(K¡M)p
¡(L¡1)¡1
i
PK
k=1 p
¡(L¡1)¡1
k
; i = 1;:::;K;
0; i = K + 1;:::;N:
(10)
The optimality of (10) can be easily established using HÄ older's inequality; see the Appendix.
The solution (10) indicates that when the formulation in Press (2009) is relevant, the optimal strategy
for maximizing the probability of capturing the malfeasor is \complementary harmonic sampling" as long
as L > 1. Although I doubt its practical value, (10) provides an important theoretical insight into the
interplay between prior information and resource constraint, on purely mathematical grounds, as Press
(2009, 2010) intended. This is because QL of (10) turns out to connect the two cases of interests, namely
Q1 and uniform sampling. Perhaps expected, Q1 is the limit of QL when L # 1. The more interesting case
is that when L ! 1, QL converges to uniform sampling fqi = M=N; for 1 · i · Ng, which therefore
can be denoted as Q1. These facts are not hard to see formally by inspecting (10), but a rigorous proof
takes a bit of algebra; see the Appendix. The left panel of Figure 1 demonstrates this convergence for
the numerical example in Section 2 (note that there are only three distinct q values for that example.)
Using the same example, the right panel of Figure 1 compares the log of the probability of escape
for the three strategies: dashed line for the optimal strategy (10), solid line for uniform sampling, and
dotted line for the \square-root sampling" (5). Intriguingly, we see that the di®erence between optimal
and uniform sampling remains a constant on the log scale as L grows, implying that the two probabilities
are never the same but are of the same magnitude. This is not a contradiction to the fact that QL ! Q1
because their corresponding PL values converge to zero. In contrast, the probability of escape under (5)
converges to zero exponentially slower compared with either optimal or uniform sampling.
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Figure 1: Left Panel: Demonstrating optimal sampling (10) converging to uniform sampling. Right
Panel: Comparing log of the escaping probabilities.
Both phenomena are general. Let RL = P
(QL)
L =P
(Q1)
L , that is, the ratio of the probability of escape
under the optimal sampling to that of uniform sampling, and ¢L = ¡logRL. Then, as shown in
the Appendix, as soon as K = N, ¢L will decrease as L increases, indicating that the impact of the
prior information decreases as our resource becomes unlimited. However, the impact of the prior does not
vanish even at the limit, because the limit of ¢L, ¢1, turns out to be exactly the Kullback{Leibler (KL)
divergence between the uniform distribution on f1;:::;Ng and the prior; see the Appendix. Therefore,
the more informative the prior distribution, as measured by a larger KL divergence from the uniform
distribution, the larger ¢1 is. For the numerical example in Section 2, the KL divergence is 1.16, which
corresponds to the vertical distance between the solid and dashed lines (as L ! 1). Consequently, the
minimal probability of escape is never more than 1=3 (since R1 = e¡¢1 = e¡1:16 = 0:312) of that under
uniform sampling for all L, with the minimal RL = 0:186 achieved at L = 2. Note that the minimal RL
does not occur at L = 1|recall here R1 = 1=5|because RL increases with L only after K becomes N;
in this example, this occurred after L ¸ 3.
On the other hand, for large L, the probability of escape under the square-root sampling (5) is
dominated by the individual(s) with the largest probability of escape, which is eN = (1 ¡ qN)L. Since
qN has to be smaller than the uniform sampling rate M=N unless the prior is uniform (because NqN <
P
i qi = M), we see that if we replace the optimal escaping probability in RL by the escaping probability
under (5), RL will go to in¯nity at the rate [(1 ¡ qN)=(1 ¡ M=N)]L. For the numerical example here,
qN = 1=8, M=N = 1=4, and hence this rate is (7=6)L, explaining the growing distance between the dotted
line and the solid (and dashed) line in the right panel of Figure 1.
The same plot shows that the relationships among the (log) escaping probabilities are more complex
when L is small. That (5) did nearly as well as (10) when L = 5 indicates the possibility for di®erent
criteria to lead to very similar strategies in special cases. However, the main message here is that (10),
7including its two limiting cases, con¯rms our intuition that the prior information generally has the most
impact when our resource is most limited, and the least impact when our resource becomes unlimited.
However, unlike in common cases of Bayesian inference where the impact of the prior vanishes as the
size of the data goes to in¯nity, the impact of the prior can persist in a design-based context even with
unlimited resource for collecting data, an insight that is less obvious. Therefore, theoretically, the results
above indicate that uniform sampling is never optimal for minimizing the probability of escape unless
the prior is already uniform or M = N. Practically, however, achieving this optimality requires precise
knowledge of pi. Yet remarkably, uniform sampling achieves the optimal magnitude without any prior
knowledge (excluding of course the trivial case where the prior distribution is a singleton, that is, the
government can correctly identify the malfeasor based on prior probability alone). In fact, as soon as
L is large enough to ensure K = N, the ratio RL will be bounded below by NHp and above by NGp,
where Hp and Gp are respectively the harmonic mean and geometric mean of the prior probabilities
fp1;:::;pNg; see the Appendix. Consequently, one could argue that for the \malfeasor hunting" problem
as speci¯ed in Press (2009), this robust optimality of uniform sampling provides a mathematical reason
to justify its use. However, this mathematical reasoning is not applicable when our goal is to stop an
imminent threat, precisely because then L = 1, rendering the large-L argument above untrustworthy.
5 Minimizing Error-escaping Probability in Statistical Review
Incidentally, the theme of the Larry Brown conference was \Borrowing Strength: Theory Powering
Applications". The current problem is a good demonstration of the potential impact of theoretical
thinking on real-life applications, and the impact can be both positive and negative. The real-life problem
of airport security enhanced checks is of course far more complex than any mathematical formulation
in Press (2010) or in this article. For example, if we take its probabilistic modeling seriously, we need
to consider speci¯cation of a loss function, how terrorists may game the system whatever non-uniform
strategy we adopt (an issue related to the \second-order" e®ect alluded to in Press, 2009), how multiple
terrorists may coordinate in their actions, etc. Whereas such issues may be extremely hard to model
theoretically, the associated thought process itself could help prevent us from using the mathematical
optimality of Q1 under the simple criterion (3) as the argument for strong pro¯ling, or from using the
erroneous (2) or inferior criterion (1) as mathematical reasoning for the opposite. Incorrect mathematical
reasoning can only serve as distractions, much like a technical oversight in a court argument is often used
to distract the juries from otherwise irrefutable evidence.
These distractions could have been easily avoided if they had been identi¯ed during the review
process. If there is any profession that should be particularly alerted by a larger-than-one probability or
by mixing sampling with replacement with sampling without replacement, it must be ours. Ironically,
therefore, the \Surprisingly, and bizarrely" sentiment also describes my feeling towards the fact that
8these oversights passed through our editorial checkpoints. Sadly, this is not the ¯rst time that a larger-
than-one probability was permitted to pass a statistical editorial checkpoint (see Meng, 1995), and it
would be another glaring error if I were to predict that this is the last time. Whereas the consequences
of false negative errors at editorial checkpoints are of no comparison to those at airport checkpoints (at
least in the short run), I couldn't help but wonder if the underlying probabilistic strategies are similar.
We all should exercise our due diligence to minimize the error-escaping probability for every paper we
review, not merely hope to minimize the expected time to detecting the next improbable probability.
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Appendix: Mathematical Proofs
I. The Optimality of (5). We ¯rst write
¹ =
N X
i=1
pi
qi
=
I X
i=1
pi
qi
+
N X
i=I+1
pi
qi
: (11)
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
CI ´
Ã
N X
i=I+1
p
pi
!2
=
Ã
N X
i=I+1
r
pi
qi
p
qi
!2
·
Ã
N X
i=I+1
pi
qi
!Ã
N X
i=I+1
qi
!
; (12)
where equality holds if and only if qi /
p
pi;i = I + 1;:::;N: Therefore, when I = 0, (2) follows from
(12) immediately because the qi's de¯ned there make equality hold in (12) and none of them exceeds
9q1 = ~ q1 < 1, which holds by the de¯nition of ~ qI. When I > 0, combining (11) and (12) together with
PN
i=I+1 qi = M ¡
PI
i=1 qi, we see that for any 0 < qi · 1;i = 1;:::;N,
¹ =
N X
i=1
pi
qi
¸
I X
i=1
pi
qi
+
CL
M ¡
PI
i=1 qi
´ f(q1;¢¢¢ ;qI): (13)
For any i = 1;:::;I, we have
@f
@qi
= ¡
pi
q2
i
+
CI
(M ¡
PI
k=1 qk)2 · ¡pI +
CI
(M ¡ I)2; (14)
because pi ¸ pI and qi · 1 for all i = 1;:::;I, and I < M whenever M < N (the M = N case is trivial).
But the right-hand side of (14) is non-positive if and only if ~ qI ¸ 1, which holds by the de¯nition of I.
Hence f(q1;:::;qI) ¸ f(1;:::;1) for all 0 · qi · 1. Consequently, (13) implies
¹ =
N X
i=1
pi
qi
¸
I X
i=1
pi +
CI
M ¡ I
; (15)
proving (5) because qi's there satisfy 0 · qi · 1,
PN
i=1 qi = M, and they achieve the bound in (15).
II. The Optimality of (10) and Its Limiting Cases. To prove the optimality of (10) for any L > 1,
we ¯rst write
PL ´
N X
i=1
(1 ¡ qi)Lpi =
K X
i=1
(1 ¡ qi)Lpi +
N X
i=K+1
(1 ¡ qi)Lpi: (16)
Because (1 ¡ qi) = [(1 ¡ qi)p
1=L
i ][p
¡1=L
i ], by HÄ older's inequality, we have
K X
i=1
(1 ¡ qi) ·
"
K X
i=1
(1 ¡ qi)Lpi
# 1
L "
K X
i=1
p
¡(L¡1)
¡1
i
#1¡ 1
L
; (17)
where equality holds if and only if 1¡qi / p
¡(L¡1)
¡1
i ;i = 1;:::;K: Therefore, when K = N, (10) follows
from (17) immediately because the qi's de¯ned there make equality hold in (17) and none of them goes
below qN = ¸ qN > 0, which holds by the de¯nition of ¸ qN. When K < N (recall K ¸ M), combining
(16)-(17) with
PK
i=1 qi = M ¡
PN
i=K+1 qi, we see that for any 0 · qi · 1;i = 1;:::;N,
PL ¸
"
K ¡ M +
N X
i=K+1
qi
#L
D
1¡L
L +
N X
i=K+1
(1 ¡ qi)Lpi ´ g(qK+1;:::;qN); (18)
where DL =
PK
i=1 p
¡(L¡1)
¡1
i . Di®erentiating g with respect to qi;i ¸ K + 1, we obtain
@g
@qi
= L(K ¡ M +
N X
i=K+1
qi)L¡1D
1¡L
L ¡ L(1 ¡ qi)L¡1pi ¸ L
£
(K ¡ M)L¡1D
1¡L
L ¡ pK+1
¤
(19)
because qi ¸ 0 and pK+1 ¸ pi for i ¸ K + 1. But the right-hand side of (19) is non-negative if and
only if ¸ qK+1 · 0, which holds by the de¯nition of K. Hence g(qK+1;:::;qN) ¸ g(0;:::;0) for all
0 · qi · 1; i ¸ K + 1. Combining this fact with (18) yields
PL ¸
(K ¡ M)L
D
L¡1
L
+
N X
i=K+1
pi: (20)
10This completes the proof because the lower bound in (20) is achieved by the qi's of (10), which also
satisfy the constraints that they are probabilities and that
PN
i=1 qi = M.
To establish the limiting cases of (10), we ¯rst note that there is nothing in the proof above that
requires L to be an integer, but only that L > 1. Let M1 and M2 be the smallest and the largest i such
that pi = pM; hence M1 · M · M2. Then it is easy to see that as L # 1,
¸ qM2 = 1 ¡
M2 ¡ M
(M2 ¡ M1 + 1) +
PM1¡1
k=1 (pM=pk)
(L¡1)¡1 ¡!
M ¡ M1 + 1
M2 ¡ M1 + 1
> 0;
and
¸ qM2+1 = 1 ¡
M2 + 1 ¡ M
1 +
PM2
k=1 (pM2+1=pk)
(L¡1)¡1 ! M ¡ M2 · 0:
Consequently, as L ! 1, K ! M2 and hence (10) converges to
qi =
8
> <
> :
1 i = 1;:::;M1 ¡ 1;
M¡M1+1
M2¡M1+1; i = M1;:::;M2;
0; i = M2 + 1;:::;N:
This limit is equivalent to Q1 when M2 > M1 because it also reaches the minimal value of P1, and it is
identical to Q1 when M2 = M1(= M), that is, where there is no tie for pM.
At the other extreme, as L ! 1, ¸ qN ! M=N > 0 and hence K = N when L is large enough. It is
then easy to see that as L ! 1, qi of (10) will converge to M=N for all i because p
¡(L¡1)
¡1
i ! 1.
III. The Monotonicity and Limit of RL and of ¢L
By the de¯nition of RL = P
(QL)
L =P
(Q1)
L , we see from (10) and (3) that as soon as K = N,
RL =
"
1
N
N X
i=1
µ
1
Npi
¶ 1
L¡1
#¡(L¡1)
: (21)
Using the fact that for any positive ~ a = (a1;:::;aN), h~ a(x) = [ 1
N
PN
i=1 ax
i ]1=x is a strictly increasing
function of x unless all ai's are the same, we see that RL = [h~ a((L ¡ 1)¡1)]¡1 is a strictly increasing
function of L unless ai = (Npi)¡1 are all equal. It follows then, as long as L ¸ 2, the right-hand side
of (21) is bounded below by [h~ a(1)]¡1 = NHp, where Hp = [
PN
k=1 p
¡1
i =N]¡1 is the harmonic mean of
fp1;:::;pNg. To get the upper bound, we let L ! 1 and applying the L'Hospital's rule, which yields
R1 = lim
L!1
RL = N
Ã
N Y
i=1
pi
!1=N
= NGp;
where Gp is the geometric mean of fp1;:::;pNg. Hence, as long as the prior is not uniform, we have
0 < NHp < RL < NGP < 1;
¢L = ¡log(RL) is strictly decreasing, and
¢1 = ¡logR1 = N¡1
N X
i=1
log(N¡1=pi);
which is the Kullback{Leibler divergency between the uniform distribution fN¡1;:::;N¡1) and the prior
distribution fp1;:::;pNg. [Note all results above assume L(¸ 2) is large enough to ensure K = N.]
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